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The German government frequently stresses that it pursues a “restrictive arms export 
policy”. And yet, some of the biggest customers of German arms manufacturers are 
countries in the Middle East (MENA region) in particular. In their comments Simone 
Wisotzki (HSFK) and Max Mutschler (BICC) criticise in particular German arms exports to 
states which–as in the case of Libya–violate UN arms embargoes. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was one of the top ten recipients of German arms 
exports in 2017 and Turkey also regularly purchases German weapons technology. An 
Expert Report on the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1973 
identifies these two countries, along with Jordan, as suppliers of weapons and military 
equipment to the warring parties in the Libyan conflict. In so doing, they are breaching 
the UN arms embargo in place since 2011. Germany exporting arms to recipient 
countries such as these carries the risk of weapons showing up in Libya’s civil war zone 
and is therefore something the German government should not be pursuing. 
 
Civil war being fought with German weapons? 
 
With the help of his Libyan National Army (LNA), General Haftar hopes to bring down 
the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Haftar began his 
military offensive in April 2019 with an attack on the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Although 
Haftar’s troops were forced to withdraw from the critical al-Watiya air base, he 
continues to have control over large parts of Libyan national territory. 
According to media reports, over the last year there has already been evidence of armed 
groups in Libya, and specifically militia General Khalifa Haftar, using military equipment 
from Germany in combat. It is reported, for example, that the Haftar militia mounted 
Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems on military trucks bearing the German MAN 
brand. The German government approved the export of military trucks of this type to the 
UAE between 2000 and 2013. The UAE has repeatedly and blatantly violated weapons 
embargos in the past, in Eritrea and Somalia, for instance. In addition to the arms 
supplied to the UAE, arms exports to Egypt and Jordan are at risk of being sent on to 
Libya by the original recipient countries, both supporters of General Haftar, in doing so 
breaching the UN arms embargo. Further, the UAE has also deployed its own soldiers to 
the conflict. The same applies to the NATO member state Turkey, which has been 
sending troops in support of Prime Minster Fayez al-Sarraj’s government since January, 
and which receives financial support from Qatar. The Libyan central government
14 July 2020 Commentary \ The Libyan Civil War: Shining a Spotlight on a 
Problematic Arms Export Policy 
bicc \ Seite 2 \ 4  14 July 2020 Commentary \ The Libyan Civil War: Shining a Spotlight on a Problematic Arms Export Policy 
 
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn \ Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH 
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany, +49 (0)228 911-0, bicc@bicc.de www.bicc.de 
meanwhile has German military weapons, too, including 120 mm mortar grenades produced by Denel, the South 
African subsidiary of German defense giant Rheinmetall, presumably reaching the warring party via Turkey. In 
other words, both sides of the Libyan Civil War are relying on arms made in Germany or of German design. 
The case of Libya thus shines a spotlight on all the problems of Germany’s arms export policy. These include, for 
instance, deficits of arms export law regarding the arms production by foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
However, they also include the fact that the German government all too often fails to consider the medium to 
long-term consequences of arms exports when it comes to peace and security. As in the case of Libya, what we 
then see time and again is German weapons being used in wars and conflicts, a fact that ultimately is not in line 
with German foreign and security policy. 
In January 2020, Germany initiated a major peace summit in Berlin, attended not only by the parties in the 
conflict, but also various other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, Russia, and the UAE. A total of 16 states and 
organizations signed the closing declaration, in which they agreed to uphold the arms embargo. Reports from 
the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), however, document that this does not happen—various 
countries, including those mentioned above, are continuing to support both sides of the conflict in Libya by 
providing weapons, air support, soldiers, and mercenaries. Similar to Yemen, Libya is now also seeing a proxy 
conflict involving several external actors. In her briefing to the UN Security Council, the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General on Libya, Stephanie Williams, made specific mention of Turkey, a NATO member 
state, which had violated the arms embargo and is said to have supplied Prime Minster Fayez al-Sarraj’s 
government with unmanned drones as well as ground-based air defense missiles. This is something the EU has 
proven powerless to stop, despite its endeavors to monitor adherence to the arms embargo against Libya via 
Operation IRINI, which the German armed forces are also involved in. During an interview Williams emphasized 
that weapons ending up in the hands of those fighting the civil war was something she witnessed on a daily 
basis. The UN Security Council has only recently authorized an additional one-year extension of the arms 
embargo. 
 
Shortcomings in European and international standards and regulations for arms exports 
 
Between 2014 and 2018, the German government approved arms exports to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the UAE 
totaling over two billion euros (see Table 1). Since the start of this year alone Germany has authorized the 
export of 331 million euros in weapons and military equipment to Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE. The lion’s share 
of this, worth a total of 308 million euros, went on supplying a submarine to Egypt. Under the relevant 
standards and regulations governing the authorization of German arms exports, however, these arms transfers 
should not be permitted. 
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Table 1: Approved German Arms Exports to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, UAE, 
2014-2018, in euros (Source: German government reports on arms exports) 
 
 Egypt Jordan Turkey UAE 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
2017 
 
2018 
 
22.735.428 
 
18.715.126 
 
399.826.609 
 
708.258.491 
 
14.276.299 
 
1.386.573 
 
7.252.338 
 
16.605.070 
 
31.544.730 
 
9.574.756 
 
72.445.432 
 
38.965.369 
 
83.900.411 
 
34.187.941 
 
12.867.843 
 
121.219.530 
 
107.281.038 
 
169.475.128 
 
213.866.923 
 
45.267.104 
 
TOTAL 1.146.968.353 66.363.467 242.366.996 657.109.723 
 
 
Both the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in 2014, and the EU’s Council 
Common Position of 2008 contain different criteria that decisions on arms transfers have to meet. These include 
the question of whether the weapons concerned undermine peace and security (Art. 7 ATT, Art. 2, Criterion 
Four, Common Position) and whether there is a risk of the recipient country transferring the military equipment 
or technology to an “undesirable end-user” (Art. 2, Criterion Seven, Common Position). A non-state armed actor 
in a civil war such as General Haftar in Libya would undoubtedly be classed as an “undesirable end-user”. That 
said, both with regard to this issue and the question of the possible threat to peace and security, the regulations 
set down in the Council Common Position and the ATT allow governments substantial leeway when it comes to 
interpreting the criteria. 
Thus, although governments are obliged to incorporate these factors into their evaluations and conduct the 
corresponding risk assessments (according to the generally accepted definition: risk = extent of damage x 
probability of occurrence), this does not pertain to a general risk of peace and security in the state concerned 
being undermined by the transfer of arms, but rather whether those exact arms that the recipient country is 
looking to purchase hold this risk. These sets of standards lack the binding, objective benchmarks required for 
such a risk assessment. And, since the occurrence of damage is a future event, a supplier state’s government can 
always justify their arms export with the claim that, at the time it was conducted, their thorough risk assessment 
did not reach the conclusion that this very weapons system would be re-transferred without authorization. If 
the damage is incurred—with the unauthorized transfer of military equipment taking place—the government 
can claim that its risk assessment was (regrettably) erroneous, but that it did not break the rules (at least not 
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according to the letter of the law). The absence of a link between the assessment criteria and objective 
indicators is one of the main shortcomings of the arms control set down in the ATT and the Common Position. 
Arms exports to embargo violators undermine rule-based international order  
One exception to this—and one which is certainly relevant to the Libyan case—is Criterion Six of the Council 
Common Position and Article 6(1) of the ATT. Criterion Six of the Common Position shifts the attention to the 
behavior of the buyer country with regard to the international community, “in particular […] respect for 
international law”. The focus here is therefore not on assessing the risks of what might happen in the future 
with the supplied armaments, but rather, irrespective of this, on evaluating the behavior of the buyer country to 
date. 
Criterion Six already lists a number of measures for this assessment. Alongside support for terrorism and 
international organized crime, as well as compliance with international humanitarian law, a country’s behavior 
in terms of its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament is also taken 
into consideration. Governments are only obliged to take these factors “into account” when making decisions 
about arms exports. However, if Criterion Six is not to be completely deprived of meaning, such blatant and 
repeated violations of a UN arms embargo must be regarded as a significant factor at the expense of the 
potential recipient country. Moreover, Criterion One of the Council Common Position explicitly refers to the 
implementation of United Nations arms embargoes as among the international obligations of EU Member States. 
It would be downright absurd if, in decision-making regarding arms exports, potential recipient countries were 
exempt from this very obligation, which is a priority for the EU Member States themselves. 
The ATT likewise attaches high priority to compliance with the UN arms embargo. Article 6(1) of the ATT 
prohibits the transfer of weapons in the event that this would violate such an embargo. A legal commentary on 
the ATT draws the conclusion that the obligation to comply with UN arms embargoes not only pertains to direct 
exports to an embargoed country but also covers indirect supply to such a country.1 
To sum up, the international rules and regulations on the arms trade see the breach of a United Nations arms 
embargo as a particularly significant barrier when it comes to future arms exports. If the German government 
takes its self-proclaimed role as defender of the rule-based international order seriously, then it must refrain 
from authorizing arms exports to states that violate the UN weapons embargo—and, in the case of the Libya 
conflict, this includes Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Turkey. 
 
This commentary was published in the PRIF Blog at the same time. 
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1
 See Casey-Maslen, Stuart/Clapham, Andrew/Giacca, Gilles/Parker, Sarah (2016): The Arms Trade Treaty. A 
Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
